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Abstract
Hidden terrorist cells in high dimensional communications networks arise when terrorists camouflage
connectivity to appear randomly connected to the background network. We investigate hidden network
detectability when the background network does not support terrorist activities. Using two September 11
terrorist networks as the test bed and a network measure called assortativity, we suggest hidden terrorist
networks can behave as Peer-to-Peer networks. We compare the September 11 hidden networks with Peer-toPeer networks containing embedded terrorist networks, as well as with generic Peer-to-Peer networks. Using
Peer-to-Peer characteristics and social network group-based centralities, we show that for certain Peer-to-Peer
networks it is possible to detect hidden terrorist networks in cyberspace, with potential future application to
Instant Messaging and Skype networks.
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INTRODUCTION
Terrorist attacks are a recurring threat to local livelihood and global wellbeing and in the past decade have been
enacted as the large-scale tragedies of September 11, 2001 (United States), October 12, 2002 (Indonesia) and
July 7, 2005 (United Kingdom). More recently, the Lockerbie-styled plane bombing attempts (October 2010)
reflect the ongoing global threat of terrorism. Concerns have been raised over the growing strength of terrorist
organisations such as al Qaeda, which in the last decade has increased both its membership and geographic
reach (Farrall, 2011).
A considerable body of research on modelling terrorist networks has developed in recent years. The cornerstone
publication of (Krebs, 2002) used social network measures to capture pertinent characteristics of the individuals
involved in the September 11 hijackings. In (Hussain, 2010, Borgatti, 2003) key individuals within terrorist
networks were identified such that their removal would cause maximal disruption to the network. In (Chiera,
2010) a paradigm shift from the social network analysis of individual terrorists to groups of terrorists was
introduced, by treating a terrorist cell as a hidden network – that is a network of individuals appearing randomly
connected to the background communications network whilst preserving connectivity between themselves, to
facilitate unimpeded information flow. Using the September 11 terrorist network of (Krebs, 2002), hidden
terrorist networks were characterised using group-based social network measures and were shown to be highly
visible and therefore detectable.
The conclusions drawn in (Chiera, 2010) however, were for hidden networks immersed in a larger terrorist
network. It needs to be conjectured that it may not be sufficient to consider only the social network measure and
size of the surrounding network; network type may also play an important role in detection. Specifically, are
hidden terrorist networks more difficult to detect when located in a network that does not support terrorist
activities?
In this paper we take a first step towards addressing this question. The ability to distinguish hidden terrorist
networks from a larger network backdrop has long been considered vital for successful detection and thwarting
a planned terrorist attack (Baumes, 2008), however while previous work has focused on detection dependent
upon the background network size, it is not yet sufficiently clear if hidden terrorist network detection also
depends on the whether the background network supports the terrorists’ online behaviour.
Using assortativity, a network measure of association, we will show that hidden terrorist networks can behave as
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks. Correspondingly, we generate embedded P2P networks containing hidden
September 11 terrorist networks, as well as generic P2P networks, as our test bed. Using the P2P network
characteristics degree distribution, clustering and average path length, as well as group-based eigenvector,
information, and subgraph centrality, known to be relevant to P2P networks (Estrada and Rodríguez-Velázquez,
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2005), we will investigate whether hidden networks are easily distinguishable from non-terrorist P2P network
backgrounds.
Next we review the group-based social network metrics used in this analysis. We then determine the
assortativity of hidden September 11 terrorist networks (Krebs, 2002), introduce the embedded and simulated
P2P networks and investigate their P2P characteristics. Following, we conduct group-based social network
analyses of hidden terrorist networks located within P2P networks before giving our conclusions.

CHARACTERISING HIDDEN NETWORK TYPE AND BEHAVIOUR
We wish to characterise two aspects of a hidden network: type, used to determine the network category
(Newman, 2010); and behaviour, designed to capture different facets of communication between individuals or
groups. Accordingly, we view a communications network as a graph G consisting of individuals (nodes) vi  V,
and edges eij  E, which can be viewed as lines of communication connecting individuals vi,vj, such that G ={V,
E}.
A hidden network H is defined as a sub-network of G such that VH  V, EH  E, with H treated as a single node,
vH. An example of vH is depicted in Figure 1 in which the hidden network members are denoted by green
circles. Previous analyses in this area (for example Hussain, 2010, Baumes, 2008, Borgatti, 2003, Krebs, 2002)
have focused on detecting the individuals within a hidden network. However here, as in (Chiera 2011, Chiera
2010), a hidden network will be considered as a single network node for the analysis that follows. Thus, for the
example network presented in Figure 1, this implies that the network would be considered treated as consisting
of nine nodes.

Figure 1: An example hidden network (green

nodes) immersed in a larger network (blue

nodes).

The dashed lines (- -) indicate the boundary of the hidden network node vH.
The fundamental centrality measure underlying much of the characterisations presented here is degree centrality
and while not explicitly analysed in this work, is introduced to facilitate understanding. Degree centrality is a
measure of local influence in the network (Freeman, 1979) such that a node with high degree centrality would
have many direct connections to other network nodes and would thus be considered influential.
For an individual node vi, degree centrality is the number of edges directly connected to vi. For a hidden network
H, treated as a single node vH, the normalised group degree centrality CD is defined as the ratio of the number of
non-hidden network nodes connected to H, to the number of non hidden network nodes (Everett and Borgatti,
2005), viz.



CD =

| N(H ) |
|V |  | H | 

(1)

where |.| is cardinality, N(H) is the set of all nodes vi  V such that vi  H but is connected to a member of H, with
multiple ties counted once so as not to overinflate the influence of H in the network. For example, in Figure 1
the normalised group degree centrality of H is CD = 8/(10-2) = 1.00.
Hidden Network Type: Assortativity
An indication of the type and robustness of a network can be obtained from the degree assortativity of a
network. Assortativity is the tendency observed in complex networks for nodes to connect mostly with other,
similar nodes (Newman, 2010). Similarity is typically defined on the basis of degree centrality, such that nodes
with high degree centrality may prefer to connect to other nodes with high degree centrality (assortative
mixing). In this instance the network is robust in that many network nodes would need to be removed to destroy
the overall network structure. Alternatively, nodes with high degree centrality may prefer to connect to nodes of
low degree centrality (disassortative mixing) making the robustness of the overall network structure more
sensitive to node removal.
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With a slight abuse of notation, denoting the degrees of nodes vi,vj  H as ki,kj respectively, network degree
assortativity is defined as (Newman, 2010)
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where |E | gives the total number of edges and the degree centrality of the hidden network H is defined as in (1).
A network is assortative if r>0, non-assortative if r=0 and disassortative if r<0, with r  [-1,1].
Hidden Network Behaviour: Group-Based Centrality
Eigenvector Centrality
Eigenvector centrality extends the concept of degree centrality to capture the importance of a node’s
connections. Whereas in degree centrality only the number of node connections was of interest, eigenvector
centrality takes the further step of determining the quality of these connections — labelling a node of high
degree centrality as important only if it is connected to other nodes of high degree centrality. Conversely, a
node with high degree centrality connected to nodes with low degree centrality would be classified as
unimportant. In this way, eigenvector centrality provides an indication of the most globally central network node
(Newman, 2010).
For a network adjacency matrix A, with elements Ai,j = 1 if nodes vi,vj are connected and Ai,j = 0 otherwise, the
eigenvector centrality xi of node vi is proportional to the average of the centralities of vi’s neighbours
xi

1

O

¦

j  M ( i)

A i, j x j

where M(i) is the set of nodes connected to the vith node and O is a constant capturing the relative importance of
all nodes in the network. A large value of xi indicates that node vi is considered important.
Subgraph Centrality
Subgraph centrality is also designed to extend the concept of degree centrality by taking into account the
influence of node vi beyond its immediate neighbours, to depict the ease with which information is shared
throughout the network. Using the concept of a closed walk, that is a network path comprised of repeated edges
beginning and ending at node vi, subgraph centrality is a weighted sum of the number of such closed walks of
different lengths in the network. Smaller subgraphs (closed walks of shorter length) are given more weight than
larger subgraphs, reflecting the immediacy of the influence of node vi. Subgraph centrality Cs(i) is thus defined
as (Estrada and Rodríguez-Velázquez, 2005)
f

Cs (i)

¦
k 0

Pk (i)
k!

where Pk(i) is the number of closed walks of length k beginning and ending at node vi and ! indicates a factorial.
Dividing by k! guarantees convergence of the infinite sum, as well as an appropriate weighting, based on walk
length. In practice, the summation in Cs(i) is evaluated up to |V |, the number of nodes in the network. Note that
the larger the value of Cs(i), the more easily information flows around the network, when originating at node vi.
Information Centrality
Information centrality is the only measure considered here not based on degree centrality. Rather, it assesses all
paths between two nodes to provide an alternative quantification of node importance than that produced by
eigenvector centrality, by considering the use of circuitous paths through the network. Circuitous path usage
precisely captures the situation of information sharing between terrorists via trusted parties external to the
hidden network H (Newman, 2010, Wasserman, 1994).
Following (Wu et al., 2010) we define information centrality as a function of network efficiency. Efficiency
relates the importance of a network node to a decline in communication efficiency if that node is removed from
the network. For dvi,vj, the length of the shortest path between nodes vi,vj, we define the efficiency E(G) of
network G
9
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E (G )

¦

v i z v j G

1 d v i ,v j

V V 1

from which a group-based information centrality measure CI is (Wu et al., 2010)

CI

E >G @  E >Gic@ / E >G @

where G ic is network G with node vi removed. The measure is designed such that positive information
centrality suggests network efficiency whereas a negative value would be indicative of network inefficiency.

HIDDEN NETWORK ANALYSIS: TYPE
We utilised, as a starting point for the test bed, two versions of the September 11 (9/11) network (Krebs, 2002).
The first is the core 9/11 network GC ={|V|,|E|} ={19, 27}, consisting solely of the individuals who physically
hijacked the flights (all nodes except the grey
nodes in Figure 2). The second is the full network in
Figure 2 with GE ={|V|,|E|} ={37, 82}, containing all individuals deemed complicit in aiding the September 11
terrorist attack. We consider two networks here as a means of capturing differences in hidden terrorist network
detectability in different sized networks.
We identified four hidden networks in Figure 2 based on the hijacked flights:
1.

AA Flight # 77: orange

2.

UA Flight #93: blue

3.

AA Flight #175: purple

4.

UA Flight #11: green

nodes;
nodes;
nodes; and
nodes.

A fifth hidden network, Trusted Priors (Figure 3), was identified in (Krebs, 2002) as a network of previously
acquainted individuals, all of whom believed to have been key individuals in planning the September 11 attack.

Figure 2: A reproduction of the September 11 Network (Krebs, 2002)

Figure 3: The September 11 Trusted Priors Network identified in (Krebs, 2002)
10
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Table 1: Assortativity (r) for the core and extended 9/11 networks GC, GE.
Network Type

#77

#93

#175

#11 Trusted Priors

9/11 Network G C

0.14

0.00

-0.03

-0.09

-0.14

9/11 Network G E

-0.06

-0.50

-0.39

-0.07

-0.03

We computed the degree assortativity for both 9/11 networks (Table 1). For the G C networks only AA Flight
#77 was assortative (r > 0), seemingly reflecting the fact that the hidden networks for Flight #77 and Flight # 93
are structurally similar. This is not an inconceivable result since previous work (Chiera, 2010; Lindelauf, 2009)
indicated a propensity for similar network structures based on size, coupled with a trade-off between the need
for information sharing and secrecy.
From Table 1 we see that all hidden G E networks were disassortative (r<0), particularly for Flight Networks
#93 and #175 (r = -0.50, r = -0.39, respectively). Comparing the internal structures of these two networks with
that of their direct neighbours (Figure 2), we see this disassortativity captures the difference between the simple
network structures (Flights #93, #175) as opposed to the more complex connectivity of their neighbours (Flights
#11, #77).
Comparing the G E assortativities with those of 27 different network types (Newman, 2010), it was found that
many values reported in Table 1 were categorised as Technological, where, for example, r = -0.39 for Flight
#175 network is close to r = -0.37 (the assortativity value for an undirected peer-to-peer (P2P) network,
(Newman, 2010)). Comparison of a terrorist network to a P2P network is not necessarily unreasonable since
P2P networks have the goals of decentralisation, immediate connectivity and anonymity; characteristics
attractive to a terrorist network. Moreover, P2P networks are self-organising such that the failure of a smaller
network component is less likely to spread throughout the network; correspondingly, should one hidden terrorist
network be compromised, the remaining terrorist cells would remain undetected and able to carry out their
mission.
Since our aim is to detect hidden terrorist networks in high dimensional communications networks, we are
primarily interested in terrorist communication captured at the Internet routing level, the domain of P2P
networks. Combined with the potential for hidden terrorist networks to behave as undirected P2P networks, we
wish to determine whether a hidden terrorist network embedded in a P2P network can be distinguished from a
generic P2P network structure.
Ideally, a P2P network should satisfy the following properties (Newman, 2010, Wang et al., 2006):
1.

It is scale-free with a power law degree distribution pk = Ck-, where pk is the probability a randomly
chosen node has degree k, and C is a constant. The power law exponent is typically 2   3,
capturing the phenomenon that many network nodes have low degree with only a small number having
high degree;

2.

It is small-world, that is the average hop distance between nodes is short and scales logarithmically;
and

3.

It should have a high clustering coefficient, indicating a propensity for two nodes to cluster together
with a third node. The global clustering coefficient

Cc

3N T
N3

takes the ratio of the number of triangles NT in the network with an edge between each node, to the
number of connected triples N3, in which nodes can reach other nodes either directly or indirectly.
Graph types used to simulate P2P networks include the Barabási (BA) preferential-attachment model, capturing
the scale-free and small-world properties; the Watts-Strogatz (WS) model, capturing the small-world and
clustering properties; and the Erds-Rényi (ER) random graph model, since in selected undirected P2P networks
(e.g. Gnutella) peers choose neighbours essentially at random. We used all three types as no single model
captured all P2P properties.
Using the igraph package in R, we generated:
1.

Embedded P2P Networks: 1,000 networks of types BA, ER and WS were generated for the GC and
GE networks, with the Flight #77 hidden network embedded in each, such that the link connectivity of
the hidden network to the remaining nodes was comparable to that in the original GC and GE networks.
We repeated this process for all remaining hidden networks (Flights #93, #175, #11, Trusted Priors).
11
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Peer-to-Peer characteristics and group-based centralities were calculated for each network, from which
averages were produced; and
2.

Simulated P2P Networks: generated as for the Embedded P2P networks, however without an
embedded hidden terrorist network. Averages were taken of the Peer-to-Peer characteristics and
centralities.

The degree distributions for the core and extended embedded P2P networks (Figure 4, top row) indicate that the
Barabási and Erds-Rényi networks follow a similar power law. While the actual 9/11 hidden networks also
follow a power law distribution, they are visually distinguishable from the embedded Barabási and WattsStrogatz P2P networks, although more closely mimic the degree distribution of the Erds-Rényi embedded
networks. Comparison between the embedded and simulated networks (Figure 4, top/bottom row respectively)
indicates that while there are noticeable differences between the two types of networks, it would be difficult to
visually distinguish one from the other, since a power law degree distribution is present in both cases, as would
be expected of a genuine P2P network.
The low clustering coefficients (Figure 5) of the embedded (solid line) and simulated (dashed line) Barabási and
Erds-Rényi P2P networks indicate that nodes are connected to only a small number of acquaintances. The
9/11 and Watts-Strogatz networks have larger clustering coefficients, suggesting that the number of nodes
directly connected to each hidden network is larger than for the Barabási and Erds-Rényi networks. While
there is little difference between the clustering coefficients for the embedded and simulated Watts-Strogatz and
Erds-Rényi P2P networks, the Barabási networks demonstrate a noticeable difference in coefficient size when
the hidden networks are not embedded.

12
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Figure 4: Degree Distributions. The top row shows all 9/11 hidden networks (black •), and embedded networks
using the Barabási (green *), Erds-Rényi (red +) and Watts-Strogatz (blue X) models. The bottom row shows
the simulated P2P networks without embedded terrorist networks.

Figure 5: Clustering Coefficients for the Core and Extended networks for all hidden networks of type
Krebs (black •), Barabási (green *), Erds-Rényi (red +) and Watts-Strogatz (blue X). The solid lines indicate
the Embedded P2P networks, the dashed lines indicate the simulated P2P networks.
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Figure 6: Average Path Lengths for the Core and Extended networks for all hidden networks of type
Krebs (black •), Barabási (green *), Erds-Rényi (red +) and Watts-Strogatz (blue X). The solid lines indicate
the Embedded P2P networks, the dashed lines indicate the Simulated P2P networks.
Similarly, the average path lengths (Figure 6) for the embedded and simulated P2P networks show little
difference between the Watts-Strogatz and Erds-Rényi networks, however the Barabási P2P networks show
discernibly different path lengths. The actual 9/11 networks yielded the largest average path lengths, suggesting
that although attempting to behave as a P2P network, a surrounding network directly supportive of terrorist
activities destroys the average path length property rendering the hidden network visibly distinct from a P2P
network background.
The implications of these preliminary results for the Barabási model have untapped potential for locating hidden
terrorist networks in cyberspace. For instance it may be possible to detect hidden terrorist networks as non-P2P
entities if observed in a P2P network space generally better modelled by a Barabási graph, such as Instant
Messaging and Voice over IP (Skype) networks (Newman, 2010).

HIDDEN NETWORK ANALYSIS: BEHAVIOUR
To analyse hidden network behaviour, we computed information, eigenvector and subgraph centralities for the
actual 9/11 networks, as well as the embedded and simulated P2P networks (Tables 2-4). To aid interpretation,
the 9/11 G C network is given in Figure 7.
Flight#175

Flight#11
Flight#77

Flight#93

Figure 7: A reproduction of the core September 11 Network of (Krebs, 2002).
Discussion: Information, Eigenvector and Subgraph Centrality Results
Table 2 contains the information centralities calculated for the 9/11 and Embedded and Simulated P2P networks
for both network sizes (G C , G E ). The negative information centralities for the G C and G E 9/11 networks indicate
network inefficiency if the Flight #93 and #175 networks are removed, reflecting the fact that these networks
behave as intermediaries in the communication path between the Flight #11 and #77 networks (Figure 7). Thus
their removal will detrimentally affect communication across the network.
14
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Table 2: Information Centralities CI for the 9/11, Embedded and Simulated P2P Networks
#77

#93

#175

#11 Trusted Priors

0.15

-0.13

-0.29

0.17

0.79

Erds-Rényi G C

0.13

0.08

0.13

0.13

0.23

Barabási G C

0.82

0.81

0.87

0.83

0.88

Watts-Strogatz G C

0.12

0.12

0.12

0.12

0.13

Erds-Rényi G C

0.17

0.13

0.16

0.13

0.26

Barabási G C

0.95

0.39

0.25

0.08

0.74

Watts-Strogatz G C

0.00

-0.10

-0.07

-0.03

0.17

9/11 Network G E

0.19

-0.12

-0.12

0.05

0.76

-0.05

-0.02

-0.08

-0.05

-0.08

Barabási G E

0.55

0.34

0.50

0.51

0.69

Watts-Strogatz G E

0.06

0.05

0.06

0.06

0.06

Erds-Rényi G E

0.05

-0.02

-0.05

-0.05

-0.08

Barabási G E

0.85

0.56

0.56

0.50

0.76

-0.08

-0.20

-0.22

-0.13

-0.21

9/11 Network G C
Embedded P2P G C Networks

Simulated P2P G C Networks

Embedded P2P G E Networks
Erds-Rényi G E

Simulated P2P G E Networks

Watts-Strogatz G E

Removal of the Trusted Priors group however, indicates the overall network will still function efficiently (CI =
0.79) suggesting the presence of this group is superfluous to communication across the network. None of the
embedded or simulated P2P networks produce information centralities in the region of those for the 9/11
networks, particularly the Barabási networks, which understates the importance of each flight network, as
indicated by the larger positive values.
The eigenvector centralities (Table 3) capture the importance of each of the flight networks. Recalling that the
larger the eigenvector centrality, the more important the hidden network, it can be seen that for both the G C and
G E networks, the embedded Barabási and Watts-Strogatz P2P network centralities predominantly overstate and
understate network importance respectively, when compared to the centralities for the actual 9/11 network.
The simulated networks show a better correspondence to the actual 9/11 network centralities. Note however that
the results for the embedded and simulated G C and G E Erds-Rényi networks indicates a general similarity of
importance, to make distinguishing between the embedded and simulated networks a more difficult undertaking.
Revisiting the G C network in Figure 7, we see that the “better connected” networks, in terms of eigenvector
centrality, appear to be the Flights #77, #93, #175 and Trusted Priors networks, since these networks are
connected to nodes that are themselves highly connected. The Flight #11 network possesses two unique, albeit
inferior, connections, to the remainder of the network, as reflected by the negligible eigenvector centrality
(0.06), however when immersed in the larger G E network, the eigenvector centrality of the Flight #11 network is
vastly increased due to the improved connectivity of group member Atta (Figure 2). It should be noted that
Flight #77 is considered more important in the smaller G C network (xi = 0.50) than in the extended G E network
(xi = 0.04), due to the inferiority of its connections in the latter instance.
Finally, the subgraph centralities Cs (Table 4) depicts the ease with which information is shared throughout the
network. The larger centralities for the G C Flight #175 and Trusted Priors networks (28.67, 29.56 respectively),
indicate that information circulates more easily, seemingly capturing the fact that the Flight #175 network has
multiple connections to two of the three other hidden groups in the network. In contrast, the Flight #11 network
distributes information poorly, as it is connected to two other hidden networks, albeit through nodes which
themselves are poorly connected.
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Table 3: Eigenvector Centralities xi for the 9/11, Embedded and Simulated P2P Networks
#77

#93

#175

0.50

0.57

0.60

0.06

0.60

Erds-Rényi G C

0.59

0.57

0.59

0.59

0.61

Barabási G C

0.71

0.71

0.72

0.71

0.71

Watts-Strogatz G C

0.35

0.33

0.35

0.35

0.37

Erds-Rényi G C

0.59

0.54

0.59

0.59

0.61

Barabási G C

0.87

0.46

0.46

0.42

0.64

Watts-Strogatz G C

0.39

0.54

0.50

0.44

0.59

9/11 Network G E

0.04

0.40

0.50

0.49

0.66

Erds-Rényi G E

0.52

0.49

0.54

0.52

0.54

Barabási G E

0.70

0.69

0.69

0.69

0.69

Watts-Strogatz G E

0.24

0.22

0.24

0.24

0.25

Erds-Rényi G E

0.51

0.45

0.51

0.51

0.54

Barabási G E

0.71

0.48

0.49

0.44

0.64

Watts-Strogatz G E

0.24

0.54

0.48

0.24

0.57

9/11 Network G C

#11 Trusted Priors

Embedded P2P G C Networks

Simulated P2P G C Networks

Embedded P2P G E Networks

Simulated P2P G E Networks

The reverse situation is observed for the G E network in which the Flight #11 and #175 networks are now better
located to circulate information more easily, as reflected by the larger subgraph centralities (258.21, 360.99).
The inordinately large subgraph centralities of the Watts-Strogatz models for the embedded P2P networks are
not uncommon and indicate an abundance of short path connectivity of a network node (Estrada and RodríguezVelázquez, 2005). In this case, these large subgraph centralities precisely reflect the observed low average path
lengths (Figure 5) and high clustering coefficients for the Watts-Strogatz networks.
Comparison of the subgraph centralities for the G C Erds-Rényi embedded and simulated networks (Table 4),
indicates once more, the differences between these networks are barely distinguishable from one another. This
suggests it would be difficult to detect the presence of a hidden terrorist network in an Erds-Rényi type P2P
network. Conversely, there are somewhat larger differences between the Barabási embedded and simulated
networks, particularly for subgraph centrality in the G C networks. This is encouraging since this suggests that a
smaller network background is better suited to detect such a difference, making locating hidden terrorist
networks a computationally tractable exercise.
The outcomes of the centrality-based analyses (Tables 2-4) reinforce the observation made earlier in this work,
namely that Barabási type P2P networks provide the least protection for a hidden terrorist network wishing to
avoid detection. This result paves the potential for future research in hidden network detection in cyberspace, as
there are known Barabási type P2P networks that can be modelled for such an exercise. As indicated earlier,
Instant Messaging and Voice over IP (Skype) networks provide exciting potential in this context (Newman,
2010).
Finally, it should be noted that the G C and G E hidden networks presented here have been characterised in further
detail in previous works (Chiera, 2011, Chiera, 2010) in terms of group-based social network analysis including
degree, betweenness and induced centrality, as well as network centralisation. The ease with which a hidden
network can be detected was determined using these measures, with the analysis suggesting hidden networks are
paradoxically easier to detect within larger terrorist-supportive network structures. The interested reader is
referred to these works for further details.
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Table 4: Subgraph Centralities CI(i) for the 9/11, Embedded and Simulated P2P Networks
9/11 Network G C

#77

#93

#175

#11 Trusted Priors

11.49

11.68

28.67

6.15

29.56

28.91

26.02

28.92

28.92

29.99

0.05

0.04

0.05

0.05

0.06

445,009.40 871,280.51 445,009.41 445,009.38

222,822.23

Embedded P2P G C Networks
Erds-Rényi G C
Barabási G C
Watts-Strogatz G C
Simulated P2P G C Networks
Erds-Rényi G C

26.88

26.88

28.22

28.22

30.97

Barabási G C

23.70

23.70

23.70

23.70

23.70

Watts-Strogatz G C

15.39

29.97

29.97

29.97

46.57

9/11 Network G E

66.51

188.37

360.99

258.21

254.74

171.13

121.03

181.19

171.14

207.48

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.02

>1e+13

>1e+13

>1e+13

>1e+13

>1e+12

228.10

228.10

228.10

228.10

229.08

1.73

1.82

1.89

1.90

1.90

19.03

45.69

45.69

45.69

58.99

Embedded P2P G E Networks
Erds-Rényi G E
Barabási G E
Watts-Strogatz G E
Simulated P2P G E Networks
Erds-Rényi G E
Barabási G E
Watts-Strogatz G E

Discussion: Assortativity, Limitations and Implications for Future Analysis
Finally, as assortativity provided the motivation for the bulk of the analysis presented here, some discussion on
the limitations of assortativity is in order. Whilst it is conceptually straightforward to interpret assortativity
based on the sign and size of the value reported, there are known problems with this approach (Newman, 2010).
Specifically, perfect scalar disassortativity (r = -1) occurs when the network closely resembles that of a random
mixing network, in which dissimilar nodes mix such that the nodes that are most dissimilar mix with one
another. For degree-based assortativity the conditions for perfect disassortativity become even more stringent.
Such a real-world network would be infrequently encountered and it is postulated that most disassortative
networks instead produce values closer to r = 0.0 than assortative networks (Newman, 2010).
A second point for consideration is whether obtaining a disassortativity value in the region of -0.37 necessarily
indicates that a hidden terrorist network behaves as an undirected P2P network. The results presented here
suggest some confirmation of this supposition, particularly with regards to the analysis of degree distribution,
however a more in-depth analysis into the competing characteristics of P2P networks with hidden networks of
varying sizes and configuration is needed before such a statement can be made with firmer conviction. As the
networks under consideration expand in size, it would be of interest to determine the sensitivity of the degreebased assortativity coefficient to these changes. Moreover, in the current work it is assumed the connectivity
between individuals is undirected and that each hidden network member has equal weighting in the analysis.
This may not be realistic, particularly in the case of Skype or Instant Messaging networks, and once such
assumptions are removed, assortativity will need to be re-evaluated in terms of these changes.
Finally, it should be noted that in this work we considered a global degree-based assortativity, however there are
a number of alternative definitions of assortativity. For example, it is possible to consider local assortativity
(Piraveenan et al., 2009b) used to capture an individual node’s direct contribution to the overall network
assortativity. Assortativity can also be defined as a function of time, state or network entropy (Piraveenan et al.,
2009a) and it is of interest to determine how alteration of the definition of assortativity will affect the analysis
presented here.
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CONCLUSION
We investigated whether hidden terrorist networks are more difficult to detect when located within larger nonterrorist networks. Using assortativity, we showed that hidden terrorist networks have the potential to behave as
Peer-to-Peer networks, and thus generated embedded and simulated Peer-to-Peer networks for analysis.
Quantitative analyses of these networks alongside two actual September 11 terrorist networks indicated that it is
possible to distinguish between a hidden network hiding within a larger terrorist network, a Barabási network
containing a hidden terrorist network and a genuine Barabási network.
The results of this exploratory analysis hold far-reaching potential for future research in the detection of hidden
networks in cyberspace. Future areas of research based on the work presented here include the development of
more sophisticated hidden network detection techniques, based on alternative definitions of assortativity. The
detection of hidden networks located amongst Skype or Instant Messaging traffic is deserving of attention, as
well as the development of models of the evolutionary behaviour of these hidden networks, as compared to that
of genuine Peer-to-Peer network traffic, for better detection capabilities. As the goal is to detect these hidden
networks in order to stop further terrorist-driven tragedies, it is encouraging that there are still many unexplored
opportunities in this area.
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